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This paper capitalizes on EU-LISTCO’s analytical framework to assess the 
preparedness of the European Union and Member States in addressing situations 
of limited statehood and contested orders in Mali. The first part of the working 
paper contextualizes the risks and challenges in Mali prior to the military coup 
which occurred in 2012. It identifies the fall of President Amadou Toumani Touré 
as the tipping point which led to the dramatic deterioration of the situation in 
Northern Mali. This part also unravels the components of resilience in Mali 
according to the typology suggested by Thomas Risse and Tanja Börzel (social 
trust, legitimacy of governance actors and institutional design). The second part 
focuses on the policies undertaken by the EU and three Member States (France, 
Germany, Italy). It shows that France, and to a lesser extent Germany, 
demonstrated a genuine capacity and willingness to engage in the crisis resolution 
process and foster resilience, even though some divergences have appeared. Other 
Member States, such as Italy, however, proved to be far less enthusiastic until the 
2014 migration crisis which involved their national territory. The third part of the 
working paper identifies the persistent deficit of policy coordination and the 
existence of local rent-seeking mechanisms as spoiling factors which affect the 
efforts shown by EU and selected Member States to foster resilience in Mali. 
INTRODUCTION 
As early as 2009, the European Union (EU) forecast major risks for international 
security and European interests emanating from the Sahel. In March 2011, the 
European Commission (EC) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
released a joint Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (EC and EEAS 
2011). This framework was elaborated in a context characterized by a surge of 
kidnappings targeting Western nationals in Northern Mali, political unrest from 
Tunisia to Egypt, emerging violent extremism in Mauritania, and a military 
transition in Niger. European institutions promoted a comprehensive, regional, and 
integrated approach in the region. The impetus of 2011 was seriously undermined, 
however, after the military coup against Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré 
in March 2012. In the face of mushrooming non-state armed groups, the EU failed to 
activate rapid response mechanisms. It took Brussels a full year to deploy a military 
training mission in the location of Koulikoro (EUTM Mali) and two additional years 
to launch a civilian mission in support of police forces in Bamako (EUCAP Sahel).  
The 2011 Strategy for Sahel was also updated in 2015 with a Regional Action Plan in 
the context of the migration crisis. High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini insisted on the need to foster societal 
resilience and develop the capacities of Malian administration in core governmental 
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activities. In terms of policy objectives, both the EC and EEAS stressed the need to 
facilitate the return of basic social services over the whole Malian territory. As of 
2021, the security situation in Mali remains extremely concerning in spite of the 
substantial efforts made by the EU to promote resilience-building initiatives.  
Understanding the factors of resilience in Mali is of paramount importance in order 
to gauge the preparedness of the EU and Member States to engage in contexts 
characterised by areas of limited statehood (ALS) and contested orders (CO). 
According to Börzel and Risse, ALS are areas where “central government authorities 
and institutions are too weak to set and enforce rules and/or do not control the 
monopoly over the means of violence” while CO are spaces where “state and non-
state actors challenge the norms, principles, and rules according to which societies 
and political systems are or should be organized” (Börzel and Risse 2018: 4). The 
analysis of ALS and CO in Mali is especially interesting as the root causes of the 
conflicts remain disputed within the literature (Baldaro 2018). 
Resilience itself can be defined as the “ability of states and societies to reform, thus 
withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises” (EEAS 2016: 23). 
Resilience determines how a society reacts to a sudden shock or a governance 
breakdown. It decreases the likelihood that existing factors of risk will deteriorate 
into a violent conflict (Stollenwerk, Börzel and Risse forthcoming). Börzel and Risse 
identified three fundamental dimensions that underpin resilience: the level of social 
trust, the legitimacy of governance actors, and the institutional design of governance 
arrangements (Börzel and Risse 2018). This paper takes the situation in Mali as an 
empirical case study and capitalizes on this analytical framework to assess the 
preparedness of the EU and selected Member States (France, Germany, Italy) in 
engaging in situations characterised by ALS and CO. Preparedness is understood as 
the capacity, willingness and record of success of the EU and Member States to 
anticipate, prevent and respond to governance breakdown and violent conflicts 
(Cadier and Huber 2019).  
The methodology builds on the existing literature on the Malian crisis and original 
data collected through fieldwork research in Bamako in August 2019, for which the 
author realised sixteen semi-directive interviews (see Appendix 1). In the interviews 
with EU staff working at the EU Delegation, at the civilian mission (EUCAP Sahel) 
and the military training mission (EUTM), respondents were asked to both provide 
factual details of EU action in Mali and encouraged to identify any strengths or 
weaknesses that they could observe within their own institution. Additional 
interviews were conducted with actors in the field of diplomacy (French embassy, 
Norwegian embassy), humanitarian action (OCHA), development (AFD, GIZ), and 
research (University of Bamako). 
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The paper is structured in three sections. The first contextualizes and characterizes 
the risks and challenges in Mali prior to the military coup which occurred in 2012. It 
identifies the fall of President Touré as a tipping point of the Malian crisis. A tipping 
point is here understood as the moment when risks become threats and trigger 
violent conflicts (Magen et al. 2019). This part also unravels the components of 
resilience in Mali in accordance with the variables identified by Börzel and Risse 
(2018): social trust, empirical legitimacy of governance actors and flexible 
institutional design. The second part of the working paper focuses on the policies 
undertaken by the EU and Member States in areas where orders are contested. It 
shows that France, and to a lesser extent Germany, have demonstrated a decisive 
capacity and willingness to engage in crisis resolution and resilience building 
policies. Other Member States, such as Italy, however, proved to be far less 
enthusiastic, at least prior to the 2014 migration crisis. The third part of the working 
paper identifies the persistent deficit of coordination and the existence of local rent-
seeking mechanisms as spoiling factors which affect EU and Member States efforts 
to foster resilience in Mali. Despite a coherent discourse on the need to foster societal 
resilience, the EU and Member States have not been able to coherently or 
systematically tackle the local challenges with which their policies have been 
confronted in Mali. 
1. CONTESTED ORDERS AND AREAS OF LIMITED STATEHOOD IN 
MALI 
1.1 The 2012 Military Coup as the Tipping Point of a Multidimensional 
Crisis 
The military coup against President Touré in March 2012 was a tipping point into a 
governance breakdown and resulted from both external and internal dynamics. In 
Libya, the fall of Muammar Gaddafi under international pressure led to the sudden 
and uncontrolled return to Mali of Malian Tuaregs who had enlisted in the Armed 
Forces of the Jamahiriya. A majority of these combatants, mostly aged between 20 
and 35 years old, had experienced exile, exclusion, and violence in Mali prior to their 
departure to Libya (Chebli 2014). Their return to the cities of Kidal, Ménaka, 
Timbuktu, and Gao exacerbated underlying social grievances with the government 
(Chebli 2019). Tensions escalated between the National Movement for the Liberation 
of Azawad (MNLA) led by Bilal Ag Acherif and Moussa Ag Acharatoumane and 
Bamako after President Touré decided to repress the group. 
Touré’s crisis management was considered too conciliatory by one faction within the 
Malian Armed Forces and in spite of a mediation mechanism which was tasked by 
the African Union to identify crisis resolution mechanisms (Gavelle et al. 2013). A 
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group of mutineers based in the military camp of Kati (a few kilometres away from 
Bamako) commanded by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo and Lieutenant Amadou 
Konaré defeated the close protection guards (bérêts rouges) of the Koulouba palace 
and instituted the National Committee for the Recovery of Democracy Restoration of 
the State (CNRDRE). The military junta overthrew President Touré on 22 March 2012 
and promptly intended to repeal the Constitution of 1992.   
In the meantime, the MNLA continued its war against Bamako and declared the 
independence of the Azawad region (the historical local designation of Northern 
Mali) in early April 2012. The group denied the Malian government control over this 
vast territorial area, achieving de facto partition of the country. Such a governance 
breakdown was the consequence of long-term political decisions made by governing 
elites (Baldaro 2018). The social and economic demands of Tuareg minorities have 
been met with repressive policy measures. The deafness of central government 
authorities led to order contestation and the rejection of the norms, principles, and 
rules according to which Tuareg populations were governed. Indeed, both the 
separatist (MNLA) and jihadist groups (including Ansar Eddine and Al-Qaida in the 
Islamic Maghreb, see Figure 1) promoted radically different visions of governance 
based on decentralisation for the former and religious law for the latter.  
Moving beyond the binary and subordinating categorization of Mali as a failed or 
fragile state and making an effort to characterize the situation in terms of limited 
statehood and order contestation leads to more profound sociological insight. The 
failed state model has been much disputed in the literature (Nay 2013). One of the 
main reasons is that the concept places in the same category a great variety of 
empirical situations, rarely characterizing the peculiarities of governance dynamics. 
In Mali, central government authorities are denied access in the same way across all 
regions, and the magnitude of violence varies in time and place (Nomikos 2020). 
Studies have shown that central authorities are seen as distant and uninvolved in 
rural areas which did not experience sequential violence comparable to the Tuareg 
rebellions (Craven-Matthews and Englebert 2018: 25). Second, statehood should not 
be reduced to a set of institutions which have only an objective existence. Statehood 
is also determined by the social representation, allegiance, and perception of citizens 
vis-à-vis central government authorities and administrations.  







Figure 1: Mapping jihadist groups in Mali and the Sahel 
 
 Source: Lebovich (n.d.) 
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1.2. From Risk Factors to the Outbreak of Violence 
Even though the first section identified the fall of President Touré as a tipping point 
of governance breakdown, many authors have emphasized the long-term dynamics 
of the erosion of state authority (Bergamaschi 2014; Craven-Matthews and Englebert 
2018). Prior to the 2012 military coup, the situation in Mali was characterised by 
severe social tensions between communities, a clear deficit of empirical legitimacy of 
the ruling elite, and a rigid institutional-setting, offering few powers and resources 
to regional authorities. An EU official working at the EU Delegation on development 
projects cited the lack of infrastructure and roads connecting Bamako to Timbuktu 
as empirical evidence of the marginalisation of Northern populations (Interview #5). 
In this period, poor investment in the education system, basic social services, and the 
agricultural sector combined with instances of corruption to seriously undermine 
the empirical legitimacy of political leaders. Kalilou Sidibé, who teaches 
International Relations and Political Science at the University of Bamako recalled 
that the marginalisation of Northerners by the Bambara elite is not only material 
and has been a reality since the early days of independence:  
The first political authorities who conducted the decolonisation process, their 
vision of state construction, their perception of power are the root causes of what 
came after … We considered that the country belongs to Southerners. There are 
striking elements: Bamana language is used everywhere. When you watch 
national television you have just one language, one culture in cinema production; 
everything is focused on the culture of the south. Why is there no real military 
institution with Tuaregs? Because in the marching band they only praise Samori 
Touré and Southern heroic figures. Soldiers themselves don’t figure this out. The 
nation stops at Mopti. (Interview #14) 
Even if the claims for the independence of Azawad were shortly abandoned, the crisis 
management process under President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (2013–2020) led to the 
aggravation of social tensions between communities (Baudais and Chauzal 2015). The 
deficit of horizontal trust between communities and individuals (a key component of 
societal resilience) facilitated the emergence of communitarian armed groups. After 
the Tuareg rebellion of the 1990s, the government supported the creation of 
vigilantes groups such as the well-known Ganda Koy and Ganda Izo to contain future 
uprisings. In 2006, Bamako supported two loyal figures from the North, El Hadj Ag 
Gamou (of Tuareg origin) and Mohamed Abderrahmane Ould Meydou (of Arab 
origin) in the creation of communitarian-based militias. Such armed groups 
multiplied between 2012 and 2021. The lack of control of the central government 
activity over their activity has become a vital concern (Human Rights Watch 2018).  
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One EU official suspected the existence of collusion between central government 
authorities and armed groups such as the Dogon militia Dan Na Ambassagou, which 
was held responsible for the massacre of 134 Fulanis in Ogossagou in March 2019 
(anonymised interview). Levels of violence between communities culminated 
between 2018 and 2019 and extended to areas which were previously not subject to 
conflicts. Climatologist Hartmut Behrend maintains that: 
The essential conflict constellation in the Sahel is a conflict for the utilization of 
agricultural land between nomads and the sedentary farmers further to the south. 
Due to land degradation, the nomads on the southern border of the Sahara have to 
move ever further to the south in winter in order to ensure their livelihoods. 
(Behrend 2015: 74) 
Land degradation has exacerbated competition between nomadic pastoralists and 
sedentary farmers (Benjaminsen and Ba 2019). At least 600 people were found dead 
and 66,000 left their homes within one year in the central regions (Carayol 2019). In 
April 2020, the corpses of three Tuaregs from the Imghad tribe were found burnt. 
This event provoked emotional reactions amongst citizens from the north but very 
few responses by military authorities. The perception of impunity has aggravated 
bitterness and triggered escalations of interpersonal, if not communitarian, violence. 
In Mali, existing risks such as the lack of societal trust, the poorly flexible 
institutional design, and the weak legitimacy of political leaders led to violent 
conflicts after the fall of President Touré in a context where central government 
authority is contested and has proved unable to settle disputes. 
2. EU AND MEMBER STATES IN MALI: POLICIES AND DRIVERS 
2.1. Fostering Resilience in a Conflictual Environment 
Even if Brussels became involved in various security policies towards the Sahel, EU 
officials in Bamako like to recall that the relations between the EU and Mali are 
ancient, extensive, and multi-sectoral. The country was still under colonial 
administration when the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
was signed in 1957. From this period, the Convention of Yaoundé (1963), the 
Convention of Lomé (1975–2000) and the Cotonou Agreement (2000–2020) have been 
the major mechanisms organising the relationship between the EU and African 
countries (Marchetti 2020). The preparedness of the EU and Member States in 
addressing situations of ALS and CO in Mali should therefore be understood as 
continuity in a long-term process of integration of Africa-EU relations (Marchetti 
2020).  
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A perusal of the initiatives and political discourse on the Sahel prior to the 2012 
military coup clearly shows that there were instances of anticipations as well as 
attempts to prevent the risks of governance breakdown. Since the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, the EC has sought to foster resilience in Mali through a myriad 
of instruments including, among other things, the African Peace Facility, the 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, budget support mechanisms, and the 
European Development Fund which amounted to €30.5 billion from 2014 to 2020. 
Since 2012, the EC has settled an Emergency Trust Fund, State-Building Contracts, 
and an External Investment Plan. In total, the EU and Member States remain the 
most important donors in Africa (€74 billion in 2018). The policies directly conducted 
or financed by the EC focus essentially on institutional reforms. 
Despite a political discourse insisting on the need to foster societal resilience, after 
military coup against President Touré the focus has essentially been on more 
conservative institutional capacity building. The EU’s approach aimed at enhancing 
the capacity of central government authority to recover core prerogatives, which is 
perceived as a prerequisite for societal resilience. The EU’s intervention is thus:  
… based on shared ideas about liberal interventionism in which attempts are made 
to establish a particular kind of political authority and monopoly on violence 
through formal bureaucratic institutions and security forces, to enforce the will of 
state institutions across the state’s territory. (Cold-Ravnkilde and Jacobsen 2020: 
857)  
To this end, two missions were deployed under the framework of the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Figure 2). The European Union Training Mission 
(EUTM) was established in February 2013 on the basis of a request by the Malian 
Government and supported by the resolution 2085 of the United Nations Security 
Council. The mission aims at consolidating the operational and strategic 
organisation of the Malian Army (through advice, training, military education, and 
improvement of the human resources system). In 2019, the EUTM mission 
accommodated 620 personnel from 22 European countries and 5 other troop 
contributing nations, with a budget of €59.7 million.  
Since January 2015, the EU has also conducted a civilian capacity-building mission 
(EUCAP) mandated to foster the implementation of Security Sector Reform and 
improve the operational efficiency of security forces (i.e., the Gendarmerie 
Nationale, Police Nationale, and Garde Nationale). The reforms were designed to 
enable effective administration of territory and contribute to enhance the empirical 
legitimacy of security forces, with particular attention to respect for gender and 
human rights. The strategy of EUCAP Sahel is to foster resilience through the 
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relocation of legitimacy from non-state armed groups to legal institutions, including 
at the level of regional authority. Such a “monopoly of legitimacy is primarily sought 
by applying a plethora of liberal normative principles: human rights, democracy, and 
rule of law, good governance, local ownership, human security, inclusivity and 
gender equality” (Jayasundara-Smits 2018: 236). The respect of human rights 
standards is indeed an important aspect of the mandate of the EU’s civilian CSDP 
mission. The budget for the year 2018 was €28 million, and the mission was 
constituted of around 140 European experts and 54 Malian experts working on 
forensics, communication and information systems, counter-terrorism, intelligence, 
border control, gender, and human rights.  
Figure 2: Mapping EU and Member States’ interventions in the Sahel 
 
Source: Lebovich (2018). 
In 2018, the EEAS sought to advance further its integrated approach through the 
regionalisation of CSDP missions. Brussels decided the establishment of a Regional 
Advisory and Coordination Cell (RACC) with a staff of 22 civilian and military staff to 
be deployed in EU Delegations and CSDP missions in Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, 
Niger and Chad (EEAS 2021). One of its missions is to support the institutionalisation 
of the G5 Sahel organisation. Together with the diplomatic engagement of the EU 
Special Representative in the Sahel (EUSR), the RACC should also facilitate the 
coordination of CSDP instruments on the ground. Even though some observers have 
argued that the EU has not been reactive enough after the 2012 governance 
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breakdown (Petit 2013), Brussels-based institutions have funded a considerable 
number of programmes under the EU Trust Fund since 2014 (see Appendix 2). 
In July 2015, a trilateral peace agreement was reached, under the mediation of 
Algeria, between the government, rebel movements (Coordination des Mouvements de 
l’Azawad) and loyalist armed groups (Government of the Republic of Mali and 
Signatory Movements 2015; see also International Crisis Group 2020). The agreement 
draws a sharp distinction between “signatory” armed groups (both independentists 
and pro-government) and “terrorist” armed groups refusing to cease fire for various 
reasons (Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, Groupe de Soutien à l’Islam et aux 
Musulmans). For two years, Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, elected in 2013, 
closed the door to negotiations with jihadist factions. However, the absence of an 
overt political dialogue with these actors made the Algiers peace agreement 
extremely difficult to implement in places characterised by heavily contested orders, 
such as Kidal. Dialogue with all stakeholders, including violent actors, is paramount 
for the implementation of peace agreements (Stollenwerk, Börzel, and Risse 
forthcoming) but is still not being pursued in Mali at the time of writing. In 2021, the 
2015 Algiers peace agreement remains the political framework supported by the EU 
and Member States in Mali, thus excluding the most radical armed groups from the 
conflict management process. 
The position of central government authorities on the possibility of a dialogue with 
armed groups has experienced several inflection points. At the occasion of a 
Conférence d’Entente Nationale (2017) and a Dialogue National et Inclusif (2019) many 
voices pressured the government to engage a dialogue with Iyad Ag Ghali and 
Amadou Koufa, the two central figures of Malian jihadism. Tiebilé Dramé, a 
prominent political personality in the national sphere and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs was himself an ardent defender of a dialogue for the sake of reconciliation. 
Other influential actors ranging from religious authorities (Mahmoud Dicko) to civil 
society organisations (Association Faso Dambe Ton) and scholars supported the idea. 
An EU official confirms that unofficial channels and intermediaries have always 
existed, but talking overtly to jihadists would be unacceptable for European actors 
(Interview #8). 
A few months prior to the military coup that overthrew his presidency, Ibrahim 
Boubacar Keïta declared on TV that he was ready to open a dialogue with Amadou 
Koufa and Iyad Ag Ghali (Boisbouvier and Perelman 2020). It is worth mentioning 
that a policy of social appeasement was attempted by Bamako with the establishment 
of a Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, and the proposition of an amnesty law 
(Loi d’Entente Nationale) for certain crimes. The mechanisms of reconciliation have 
been strongly opposed by families of victims who demanded justice on the basis of 
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Article 46 of the Algiers peace agreement against impunity. These critical voices have 
been defended through a joint project funded by the EU (€2 million) and initiated by 
Lawyers without Borders Canada (ASFC), the International Federation for Human 
Rights (FIDH), the Malian Association for Human Rights (AMDH), and Amnesty 
International on this matter (FIDH 2021). 
At the diplomatic level, the EU promoted flexible, fair and transparent institutions. 
Brussels-based institutions consistently supported free and fair election processes 
and encouraged an administrative decentralisation process which would empower 
regional authorities. Institutional design, understood as the extent to which 
institutions are “fit for purpose” and able to guarantee effective governance (Börzel, 
and Risse 2018: 24–26) is indeed a vital component of resilience. Nevertheless, the 
results of the 2016 municipal elections and the 2018 presidential elections were both 
highly contentious. Many irregularities were reported and voting procedures could 
not be guaranteed in locations in areas of order contestation. Between 2018 and 2019, 
the leader of the opposition , Soumaïla Cissé, denied the victory of Ibrahim Boubacar 
Keïta, undermining the legitimacy of the latter. In response, President Keïta 
attempted, in vain, to constitute a coalition government including key figures from 
the opposition parties. He notably announced that his government would work on a 
constitutional reform which would consecrate the legal dispositions of the 2015 
Algiers agreement, although the first draft of the reform also extended in a 
significant way the Presidential prerogatives.  
Figure 3: Trust of the population in the state’s capacity to provide security 
by region of residence 
 
 Source: INSTAT Mali (2018) 
Between Keïta’s first election in 2013 and his ouster in 2020, the confidence of Malian 
citizens towards their President plunged. In December 2019, he was credited with 
only 26.5% of favourable opinions while the religious leader M’Bouillé Haidara (also 
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known as the Chérif de Nioro du Sahel) was credited with 75.2% (Maliweb 2019). This 
gap is an indicator of the lack in empirical legitimacy of the governance actors 
responsible for finding a political solution to the crisis. According to one opinion 
survey, close to 60% of Malian interviewees have no confidence in their judicial 
system and more than 90% consider that there is a high level of corruption (Mali 24 
Info 2019a). Fostering vertical trust (towards institutions) and transparency in Mali 
remains a long term and crucial challenge for the EU and Member States. 
Support to local administrations by the EU and Member States should be avoided in 
situations where central government authorities may use it in ways which are 
incompatible with societal resilience, such as political repression. A few weeks prior 
to this coup, a study of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
warned as follows: 
Domestically, the current regime is increasingly contested. Its inability to restore 
security, the protracted implementation of the 2015 peace agreement (which refers 
to the crisis in northern Mali and does not reflect the current situation in the 
country), the extension of the crisis to other Malian regions, the contested 
legislative elections held during the …COVID-19 … pandemic and the abduction of 
the main opponent to the president, Soumaïla Cissé, have fuelled recent 
discontent. (Baudais 2020) 
In Spring 2020, an unprecedented wave of contestation brought thousands of 
citizens in the streets of Bamako under the banner of the Mouvement du 5 Juin- 
Rassemblement des Forces Patriotiques (M5-RFP). This heterogeneous movement 
responded to a call by a figure associated with radical Islam, Salafi imam Mahmoud 
Dicko. Tensions eventually culminated when a special forces unit devoted to 
counterterrorism (FORSAT) was ordered by the Minister of Interior to contain the 
protesters. The use of force by the FORSAT led to the death of at least eleven civilians. 
The FORSAT had been trained and equipped by various programmes conducted by, 
among others, the EU and Member States. This constitutes one of the major 
challenges, if not the most important when it comes to building the capacity of 
security forces. President Keïta was eventually toppled by a military junta on 18 
August 2020, which opened a new sequence of uncertainties and demonstrated that 
since 2012, the EU and Member States have not succeeded in fostering societal 
resilience. 
2.2. The Drivers of Policy Responses: Three Contrasted Examples 
This part proposes to focus on the policy choices of three selected Member States 
which have responded in highly contrasting ways to the challenges of ALS and CO in 
Mali: France, Germany, and Italy. France has made the most significant efforts to 
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respond to order contestation in Mali since the 2012 military coup, both at the 
bilateral level and through EU policies (it has sent the largest number of experts to 
the EUCAP mission since 2015). French involvement in Mali results from the decision 
of national policy-makers to make counterterrorism a top priority in the foreign 
policy agenda (Henke 2017). It is also the expression of a deeply rooted “security 
imaginary” (Weldes 1999: 10) in which Mali, like other French former colonies, is 
considered as part of a traditional sphere of influence well-known as the “pré carré” 
(Erforth 2016). 
This security imaginary creates shared expectations and is reproduced by African 
actors. After the 2012 military coup against President Touré and the short period of 
military transition, Dioncounda Traoré, who was then recognized as the legitimate 
Head of State in virtue of a constitutional provision, requested a military 
intervention by the EU and Member States to contain jihadist groups which 
threatened to enter Bamako. France was then the only country which proved to be 
willing and able to intervene swiftly (Petit 2013). If the French military intervention, 
known as Opération Serval, was lauded as an operational success by policymakers, 
the expansion of the intervention theatre in the Sahel from August 2014 (Opération 
Barkhane) has been questioned. In many Malian locations, an unfriendly discourse 
flourished and revived the usual accusations of neo-imperialism (Charbonneau 
2008). According to one opinion survey, 80% of citizens developed a negative opinion 
towards France (Mali 24 Info 2019b).  
France has been described as responsible for the destabilization of Libya and is 
sometimes suspected of pursuing a hidden agenda in the region by various actors 
(Guichaoua 2020). These allegations have been made by actors ranging from 
influential Malian artist Salif Keïta to nationalist movements such as the Groupe des 
Patriotes du Mali (GPM). The latter called on President Keïta to oust French soldiers 
and build a military alliance with Russia (Figure 4). In January 2020, President 
Emmanuel Macron gathered leaders from the G5 Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina 
Faso, Niger, and Chad) in Southern France at the occasion of a diplomatic summit 
held in Pau intended to ‘clarify’ the political position of all stakeholders. President 
Macron accused Moscow of facilitating the anti-French discourse and conspiracy 
theories within Malian public opinion (Lutaud 2020). 
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Figure 4: Poster of a meeting organised by activist groups showing hostility 
to Opération Barkhane and calling for an alliance with Russia 
 
Source: GPM (2019). 
One response to these allegations has been active lobbying by French diplomats to 
seek more active involvement by other European countries in Mali. In March 2020, 
Paris deployed the Task Force Takuba, whose mission consists in the active 
monitoring of Malian Armed Forces by European special forces during operations 
against terrorist organisations. The mission reached an initial operational capacity 
in July 2020 after the deployment of special forces from Estonia and Czech Republic. 
Sweden, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, and the Netherlands committed to send troops 
and/or senior military officials while Greece, Belgium, Hungary, Ukraine, Slovakia, 
and Norway expressed an interest in the initiative (Gros-Verheyde 2021). 
Although Germany sought to stand aside from Task Force Takuba (and any active 
engagement which would go beyond military training), Berlin developed a strong 
interest in the Sahel region after the formation of the political coalition between 
CDU/CSU and Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) parties and, above all, in the 
context of the migration crisis of 2014–2015 (Tull 2020). Germany has increasingly 
undertaken initiatives such as the elaboration of a comprehensive strategic 
framework (Federal Government of Germany 2014, 2019). The German Foreign 
Affairs Ministry established a division on crisis prevention, stabilisation, and post-
conflict with a €300 million annual budget and 130 agents. For German policy-
makers, military tools should only be deployed in support of an integrated approach 
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which would focus on development and good governance. In addition, Germany 
provides a regular contribution to the EU military training mission (EUTM). Foreign 
Affairs Minister Heiko Maas has declared as follows: 
I regard Germany’s engagement in EUTM Mali as a concrete example of how 
responsibility can be taken on. We are doing this within the structures of the 
European Union’s common security and defence policy. That too is an important 
aspect. In this way, we are also showing how much importance we attach to a 
common European approach, particularly in security and defence policy (Maas 
2019). 
Due to linguistic difficulties, Berlin could not send many experts to the French-
speaking EUCAP Sahel mission in Mali as acknowledged by a member of the 
organisation (Interview #4). According to the same source, French officials in 
Brussels insisted on the need to maintain high standards regarding linguistic 
proficiency. Generally speaking, French policy drivers have not been fully 
understood by German diplomats, even though officials at the highest level have 
continually emphasized the convergence of the two countries. Berlin was on the first 
line of the creation of different initiatives; the G20 African Compact, Stability and 
Security Pact for the Sahel, and Sahel Alliance. The latter initiative was launched in 
July 2017 after the German-French Council of Ministers decided to coordinate policies 
on education and youth employment, agriculture and food security, energy and 
climate, governance, decentralization, and internal security. The Sahel Alliance (2021) 
has announced 730 projects to be achieved by 2022 with total funding of €11 billion. 
Surprisingly, Italy is almost absent from Mali. Rome contributes occasionally to 
EUCAP Sahel and EUTM but has seemed to show a preference for the UN mission 
(MINUSMA). One could note that former head of Italian government Romano Prodi 
served as UN Special Envoy for Sahel in 2012. Generally speaking, Italian policies in 
the Sahel focus on migration issues and are concentrated on Niger, where an 
embassy opened in 2018 and a military cooperation agreement was recently signed. 
In 2016, half of the migrants who reached the island of Lampedusa had transited 
through the city of Agadez (Boas 2021). In January 2019, Luigi Di Maio accused France 
of being responsible for the low development of African economies and ultimately 
for current migration dynamics (Le Monde 2019). This statement caused notable 
diplomatic tensions between Paris and Rome, and the Italian ambassador in Paris, 
Teresa Castaldo, was summoned by the French foreign affairs ministry.  
The French, German, and Italian examples were selected here to emphasise the 
plurality of policy responses and interests among Member States. Other Member 
States have traditionally shown scepticism regarding the use of military instruments 
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(such as Finland) but would certainly be enthusiastic about promoting civilian crisis 
management (Interview #3). Other countries, such as Poland, initially considered that 
the Sahel was not a priority in their foreign policy agenda (Ibid). In this regard, the 
migration crisis of 2014–2015 had an unintended and significant effect on the 
reconfiguration of the political preferences of Member States. However, the 
proliferation of instruments established through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for 
Africa led to a “security traffic jam” (Cold-Ravnkilde and Jacobsen 2020) in which 
actors have been compelled to hold deconfliction meetings on a regular basis 
(Interview #1). 
Figure 5: EU government’s approach on whether Mali and the Sahel should 
be treated as a priority in the EU’s Africa Policy 
 
Source: Busse et al. (2020) 
3. SHORTCOMINGS AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 
3.1. Improving the Coordination of Policy Responses 
Since the fall of President Touré in 2012, Mali has experienced an inflation of both 
multilateral and bilateral policy responses (Lopez Lucia 2019). On the ground, the 
disjunction in the functioning of policy instruments in terms of planning, mandate, 
and duration has been identified as a major challenge by EU staff in Bamako 
(Interview #3). A better coordination of instruments is needed, alongside better 
political alignment among Member States on which priorities should top the agenda 
(security, governance, socio-economic opportunities, education, and health). A 
member of the EU Delegation in Bamako recognized: “to be honest, we don’t know 
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what to do. Should we work on structures? Infrastructures? Modernisation? 
Governance? Demography? Purchasing power? Nutrition? Everything seems to be a 
priority” (Interview #5). 
Since 2020, the EU has been officially designated as responsible for the coordination 
of two essential pillars of the newly established International Coalition for Sahel 
(strengthening armed forces and redeploying state administration across the 
territory). This coordination role is channelled within the EEAS by a Secretary of the 
Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel (S-P3S). Member States have also 
acknowledged a need to better coordinate policy responses and realign short-term 
crisis management with long-term efforts to foster resilience. In June 2020, German 
Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas asserted: 
Our common goal with the Sahel countries is to coordinate international efforts in 
the security sector in a more targeted manner. We want to train and equip the 
security forces of the Sahel countries in such a way that they can independently 
ensure the security of the population and that people’s confidence in the authority 
and presence of the state grows once again. The coalition is committed to a 
networked approach consisting of security, stabilisation, humanitarian and 
development policy measures, because we know that security and development go 
hand in hand (Maas 2020). 
The deficit of coordination has undermined the efficiency of instruments and has 
made it difficult to gauge the isolated impact of EU and Member States’ policies. The 
impact of EUTM Mali could only be evaluated by its outputs (i.e., the number of 
trainings delivered) leaving aside the evaluation of outcomes. Since 2013, the 
military mission formed around 14,000 members of the Malian Armed Forces (8 Joint 
Tactical Groups, 7 Joint Tactical Elements, 18 Combined Mobile Advisory and 
Training Teams, 7 Company Commander Courses, and 3 G5 Sahel Staff Officers 
courses). In the meantime, EU officials are conscious of the limits of this quantitative 
methodology. In addition, military advisors working in the EUTM complained that 
they have no control over what the soldiers become after they receive the training or 
how they implement the knowledge they built. In a context of conflict, the Malian 
armed forces are still regularly held responsible for exactions on civilians such as 
summary executions, ill-treatment, and arbitrary arrests (Human Rights Watch 2017) 
The EU and Member States should therefore develop tracking mechanisms 
specifically dedicated to both ex ante and ex post identification of the trainee. Media 
sources revealed for example that members of a non-state armed group supporting 
Bamako, the Groupe d’autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA), had been trained 
by the EUTM mission (Jeune Afrique 2015) prior to the creation of the militia. To a 
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larger extent, the EU and Member States should maintain their efforts to produce 
clearer indicators in order to better track the evolution of institution-building in the 
long run. As one official working at the EU Delegation in Bamako explained: 
EUTM exists and that is a good thing. But their work is systematically dissolved 
after a few months. There is cheating on the payroll volume which means that the 
Malians have no interest in keeping the trained battalions constituted. So ... 
projects [are signed off on] with EUTM, and once the training is over ... the unit [is 
disbanded]. It allows [cheating] on the traceability of the payroll and the size of the 
army. It's a very well-oiled machine. (Interview #5) 
In addition, the EU and Member States should be more sensitive to the way EU staff 
on the ground are perceived and how they interact with Malian counterparts. As 
Korosteleva (2020: 257–258) puts it, “resilience cannot be engineered externally, and 
can only be internally nurtured with external assistance as and when necessary, 
drawing on existing resources”. Such logic can be observed on the ground and 
described by Boas (2021: 59) who relates that when he and his colleagues: 
… in a meeting with EUCAP Mali in Bamako in October 2018, asked EUCAP Sahel 
Mali officials whether they had reflected on how local populations along the 
border would interpret the new policy of improved border management, we were 
met with bewilderment. The thinking seems to be both that what is good for 
Europe—improved border management—must also be good for local populations, 
and that what works in Europe (GAR-SI is based on a Spanish module) should also 
work in the Sahel. This seriously calls into question the context and conflict 
sensitivity that EU policies and programming in the Sahel supposedly have.  
In a research conducted on EUTM, Tull (2019: 11) has pointed out the dissonance 
between EU actors and Malian authorities and that the former “make claim to 
superior knowledge and expertise, denying their Malian counterparts’ professional 
values and expertise”. EU staff interviewed for this EU-LISTCO study acknowledged 
that capacity-building practices have not always been context-sensitive (Interview 
#12). 
3.2. Engaging Local Stakeholders and Addressing Rent-seeking 
Mechanisms 
Addressing rent-seeking mechanisms remains the most vital and difficult challenge 
for EU staff on the ground seeking to genuinely engage all Malian actors. The 2015 
Algiers peace agreement established several peace resolution mechanisms designed 
to re-incorporate former combatants into Malian society. The programmes for 
demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration such as the “reconstituted armed 
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forces” encouraged by EUTM and MINUSMA have proved to be especially attractive 
to members of some armed groups (Chebli 2020). Eligible candidates were those able 
to prove that they were actual members of one signatory armed group and bring in 
person a functional weapon. This policy unintendedly enhanced the fragmentation 
of armed groups and a surge in the number of men who declared that they had 
surrendered (74,000 people declared that they were combatants in order to access the 
DDR process). 
The entanglement of long-term resilience-building policies and short-term crisis 
resolution concerns generated similar rent-seeking incentives. In many instances, 
the distribution of per diem during military training and political symposia 
contributed to supporting the status quo instead of enhancing changes. The poor 
traceability and diversion of material donations has also been noted. These existing 
practices, also reported by Cold-Ravnkilde and Nissen (2020: 939) should be tackled 
in order to engage more consistently the signatory armed groups and Malian 
administration. For instance, some armed groups who signed the Algiers Agreement 
were allegedly reluctant to partake in the project of military rebuilding. Among the 
forces who coalesced in the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), key 
figures have been suspected by the United Nations Security Council of collusion with 
terrorist groups and maintaining control over illegal drug trafficking (i.e., Mohamed 
Ousmane Ag Mohamedoune, Ahmoudou Ag Asriw, and Mahamadou Ag Rhissa). 
These stakeholders with interests in the status quo act as spoilers of EU and Member 
States’ policies since they “have the potential to disturb, undermine, or completely 
truncate processes of post-conflict state building, leading to violence flare-ups” 
(Schneckener 2009: 7). As a member of the EUCAP Sahel mission  explained: 
In four years, we are close to zero. Working on human resources reform in a war 
context is a difficult job. We see very small results. We just received the staffing 
table for the Army. It’s the first time we see a document as such … We don’t even 
know the exact number of agents in the security forces. All we know is that 25% of 
payroll is stolen. (Interview #3) 
Short-term considerations have tended to undermine resilience-building efforts such 
as the investment in the education system and favour short-term arrangements. In 
2019, the public budget amounted to 2,400 billion CFA francs, but only 926 billion 
were dedicated for investment, which represents €71 per inhabitant. The budget for 
defence and security (15.2%) was almost 3% higher than the budget for education 
(12.4%). Even though social trust has been identified as a key challenge, only 0.12% of 
the budget was allocated to the Ministry for Social Cohesion, Peace, and National 
Reconciliation. 
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A few months after the signature of the Algiers peace agreement, France and the 
OECD organised an international conference for the economic recovery and 
sustainable development of Mali (22 October 2015). The major financial and technical 
partners of Mali announced the allocation of €3.2 billion for the period 2015–2017 
(including €605 million for Northern Mali regions). If these promises were 
understood by Malian authorities as additional amounts, they actually corresponded 
to the aggregation of already planned commitments (Interview #9). By the end of 
2017, 99.5% of these commitments were actually disbursed. Yet central government 
authorities still lack resources, and the very capacity of Bamako to implement the 
dispositions of the Algiers peace agreement should be questioned (Ibid.). In 2019, net 
public spending was €71 per inhabitant. The ratio of civil servants is about 6 per 1,000 
inhabitants, while it is 160 for 1,000 inhabitants in Denmark (Viart 2018). Recalling 
the scarcity of skilled human resources in administrations, these figures suggest a 
need to increase the number of civil servants.  
As stated in the introduction, transparency of institutions and democratic 
governance is another key component of resilience. In the long run, building 
resilience requires a willingness to seriously engage efforts in two major directions. 
First, the lack of inclusion of Northerners in the national discourse and imaginary 
certainly remains a core obstacle (Interview #14), and a narrative of inclusivity and a 
shared sense of belonging should be encouraged. Second, rent dependence of Malian 
governments on external donors has to be solved. Several interviewees in Bamako 
confirmed that they had identified instances of corruption within the Malian 
administration. When they were asked about the appropriate means to tackle this 
problem, EU officials seemed to be divided. On the one hand, some pleaded for 
integrating the fight against corruption into the mandate of the civilian CSDP 
mission in Mali. On the other hand, those with a more pragmatic vision considered it 
essential to prioritise the action of the EU and Member States instead of pursuing too 
many objectives at once. To them, the question of the implementation of the peace 
agreement remains the immediate priority. 
CONCLUSION  
Since 2012, the security environment has considerably worsened in Mali in spite of 
the multiple policy responses undertaken by the EU and selected Member States. 
Most of the EU officials located in Bamako who kindly accepted to contribute to this 
study shared a common perception that the efforts have certainly been needed but 
have so far failed to bring about their full potential. It is worth noting that a few 
interviewees were convinced that the situation could have been dramatically worse 
for Malian populations without the activism of EU institutions and Member States. 
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This paper reveals that overall the EU and Member States sought to facilitate the 
crisis resolution process in areas of CO (Northern and Central regions) and foster 
resilience in ALS (Southern regions). However, in a highly sensitive political context 
characterized by a severe deficit of social trust, a lack of empirical legitimacy of 
political leaders, and strong disagreements over the appropriate institutional setting, 
fostering resilience remains more than challenging. 
The paper identified three dimensions of preparedness on the part of EU and 
Member States which could still be improved: (1) policy coordination between 
Member States and among EU institutions; (2) a more consistent and systematic 
tracing of the training and material equipment delivered, and; (3) closer attention to 
local rent-seeking and spoiling strategies, including within the Malian 
administration. Last but not least, the plethora of actors involved in Mali have 
undermined EU and Member States general efforts to foster resilience. The ‘security 
traffic jam’ in the Sahel has rather incentivized the fragmentation of non-state 
armed groups who competed to receive the material benefits of peace negotiations 
and who made the most out of the status quo. 
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 Interview #3: EUCAP Sahel Mali, Bamako, 08/08/2019 
 Interview #4: EUCAP Sahel Mali, Bamako, 08/08/2019 
 Interview #5: EU delegation, Bamako, 12/08/2019 
 Interview #6: EU delegation, Bamako, 12/08/2019 
 Interview #7: French embassy, Bamako, 15/08/2019 
 Interview #8: EU delegation, Bamako, 16/08/2019 
 Interview #9: EU delegation, Bamako, 19/08/2019 
 Interview #10: UN OCHA, Bamako, 20/08/2019 
 Interview #11: EUCAP Sahel Mali, Bamako, 22/08/2019 
 Interview #12: EUTM Mali, Bamako, 23/08/2019 
 Interview #13: Agence Française de Développement, Bamako, 23/08/2019 
 Interview #14: Kalilou Sidibé, Université de Bamako, Bamako, 28/08/2019 
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APPENDIX 2: PROGRAMMES FUNDED BY THE EUTF FOR AFRICA 
TO FEBRUARY 20211 
Title of the programme EUTF contribution Implementation Theme 
Common Operational 
Partnership (COP) Mali 
€2,850,000 
Civipol and Spanish 







Programme de renforcement 
de la résilience des 
communautés, des ménages 
et des individus vulnérables à 
l’insécurité alimentaire et 
nutritionnelle au Mali 
€25,000,000 
Humanity & Inclusion, 
SOS SAHEL, Oxford 




Création d'emplois par 
l’amélioration de la filière de 
l’anacarde, afin d’atténuer les 
causes de l’émigration, dans 
les régions de Sikasso, Kayes 
et Koulikoro 
€13,576,233 






Relance de l’Economie et 







Sécurité et Développement au 
Nord du Mali – phase 2 
€13,000,000 





Projet d’appui aux 
investissements de la diaspora 
malienne dans les régions 
d’origine 
€6,000,000 





Programme d'Appui au 
Renforcement de la Sécurité 
dans les régions de Mopti et 
de Gao et à la gestion des 
zones frontalières (PARSEC 
Mopti-Gao) 




Renforcement de la gestion et 
de la gouvernance des 
migrations et le retour et la 
réintégration durable au Mali 
€15,000,000 
Spanish Agency for 
International Development 
Cooperation , International 
Organization for Migration 
Improved migration 
management 
                                               
1
 Source: EC (n.d.) 
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Programme d'appui au 
fonctionnement de l'état civil 
au Mali: appui à la mise en 
place d’un système 
d’information sécurisé 
€25,000,000 





Youth Employment Creates 







Programme Jeunesse et 
Stabilisation – PROJES – 




Programme d'actions à impact 
rapide pour la stabilisation des 
régions du Centre Mali 




Appui au Développement 
Économique Local et à la 
prévention des conflits dans 
















APPENDIX 3: A MULTIPLICITY OF ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE SAHEL 
 
Source: EPRS (2020) 
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